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says General Wilson, "This charge of Baird's" (which was neither ordered nor made) "was one of the incidents of the day."

But the most striking illustration of the inaccuracy of this book as history is found in the following description (p. 197) of Sherman's first advance against Missionary Ridge:

"At 1 p. m. Sherman gave the order to advance on Missionary Ridge. With a hundred guns playing upon them, and with as many more answering from the Federal heights, his command gained the foot of the advanced spur of Missionary Ridge, climbed it through storms of shot and shell, beat back the bayonets that wreathed its top, clambered over the hot muzzles of the guns upon its summit, and at half-past three planted their banners there, a step nearer the superior heights frowning above. Two brigades were at once ordered to this advanced position to hold it, artillery was brought up and mounted, and soon the captured height was made impregnable to any Confederate force likely to be thrown against it."

As a matter of fact, there was not a gun fired by either side during the entire movement until after Sherman had reached his position, and then only a few between infantry skirmishers. The crest gained had not been occupied by the enemy, and when Sherman advanced at 1 p. m. there was not a single Confederate soldier within a mile and a half of it, not one was dispatched toward it until 2 p. m., and not one reached it at any time.

The eastern campaigns are presented in an interesting manner, though not altogether free from the Chattanooga method, and the reader will be attracted by the chapters on the political life, the entertaining private correspondence, the trip around the world, and the story of the last days and death of the great captain.

The most important aim of writers and publishers at this distance from the war should be accuracy. When the official record can be commanded by every one, there is no excuse either for writers or publishers in marring their work with serious errors which a few hours' examination of the *War Records* series would enable them to eliminate.

General Wilson's *Letters to a Friend* is, from first to last, a deeply interesting volume. It contains fifty letters written by General Grant to his friend Elihu B. Washburne in the freedom and the confidence of their close relations. They treat of officers, of campaigns, of reasons for action, of policies, of cruel criticisms, of political affairs, of his observations abroad—and all in the simple style and interesting method for which General Grant was noted. It is in every way, except for its brevity, a most satisfactory volume.

H. V. BOYNTON.

Life of General George Gordon Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac. By RICHARD MEADE BACHE. (Philadelphia : Henry T. Coates and Co. 1897. Pp. xxii, 596.)

THE announcement of a life of Meade by a near relative who was old enough to recollect the current impressions of the general's career whilst

the Civil War was raging, excited hopes of a memoir full of the personality of the man. The book turns out to be, rather, a narrative of the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac ; and the intimate history of Meade is limited to a dozen pages at the beginning and a score at the end of the volume. We cannot even say that the comments on the several campaigns represent Meade's views ; for he is rarely quoted, and the author informs us in the preface that he does not remember "ever having asked him a question about the war, or his ever having volunteered to speak of it, or having spoken of it to me."

Looking into the work as a new narrative on a theme often treated before, we find the standpoint of the writer to be that of a group of the younger officers who surrounded General Meade, who, starting with the intensest prejudices against the men who succeeded McClellan, transferred the dislike with equal hostility to Grant and Sheridan, when Meade was superseded in the independent command of the Potomac army. Mr. Bache was not an army officer, but he was born of army stock, was himself a civil engineer employed on army fortifications, and, as his book abundantly shows, has remained one of the coterie which has cherished the belief that military guidance of the army ended when Grant and Sheridan came from the West to play their rôles in front of Washington.

It would be hard to imagine a more interesting book than one written from such a standpoint, if only the author had buckled to his thesis with thoroughness equal to his courage, and could show us that he had mastered the material that the *Official Records* contain. As we follow him step by step, however, we find so manifest a lack of knowledge of essential documents, that the bottom drops out of each basketful of proofs of the weakness and incapacity of his *bêtes noires*, big and little.

To begin with the first battle of Bull Run, the proposition is that we must transfer from General Patterson to General Scott the responsibility for the fact that the former did not reinforce McDowell whilst Johnston went unhindered to Beauregard to turn the tide of battle against the Union army. A warm, kindly feeling toward a man who had served his country with distinction in the Mexican war and had in many ways proved his title to the name of a good and useful citizen, would make it a grateful task to relieve Patterson of censure ; but more than one student of the period has found that, to do this, one must reckon with the relentless logic which Colonel Livermore has put into his analysis of the records, in his paper published by the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts.¹ In a new treatment of the subject, that analysis must be met point by point, or the debate had much better be let alone. Mr. Bache gives no sign that he is aware of this.

General Pope was an officer of the Engineers, presumed, by the standards accepted in the army, to have the intellectual equipment worthy of his rank, as he certainly had courage and vigor. He paid a sharp penalty for wounding the self-love of the Potomac army, and Mr. Bache has not outgrown the old animosity. He is unfortunate, however, when

¹ *Campaigns in Virginia*, Vol. I., p. 3.

he selects Pope's resistance to the Confederate advance from Cedar Mountain and Culpeper as evidence of lack of judgment. He thinks Pope should at once have marched in retreat to the old lines at Centerville, close to Washington, and that he only resisted Lee because he had, by his address to the army, put "a military chip on his shoulder." As the purpose on the National side was to gain time for McClellan's army to come from the James River to join him, strenuous resistance was the plainest dictate of wisdom, and it is selecting a strong point to make an attack there. That, at least, was a merit and not a weakness. But strong or weak, Pope was not to be judged by it, for in this respect he was following Halleck's explicit orders. The policy of a stubborn, dilatory fight had been adopted from the time McClellan's return had been determined upon, and was constantly reiterated. "Stand firm," said Halleck, "until I can help you. Fight hard and aid will come soon."¹ McClellan was notified that the policy laid down for Pope was to "fight in retreat and dispute every inch of ground" if forced to fall back.²

In the campaign of Antietam General Burnside is offered up as the scapegoat, and though idolatry of McClellan is no longer in vogue and no book was ever more discredited as an authority than his *Own Story*, its assertions are here assumed to be conclusive even in contradiction of matter in which the official reports of McClellan and Burnside, made at the time, are in accord. It is enough that thereby Burnside is to be condemned. McClellan as well as Burnside had said in reports made soon after the battle, that Burnside received the order to attack the enemy's position at the lower stone bridge at ten o'clock, and it was not till McClellan had been removed from the command of the army and Burnside had been his successor, that he changed his statement and said that the latter was ordered to attack at eight o'clock.³ Granting that other testimony might be found more or less strongly supporting the one view or the other, a historical writer is not warranted in saying "there is no doubt of the substantial accuracy of this account of McClellan's." And as if in retribution, there was going through the press at the same time with Mr. Bache's work a supplemental volume of the *Official Records* in which the original of the long-lost order is given with the hour of 9:10 a. m. at its head, its writing, enclosure and transmittal from Pry's house to the heights above Burnside's bridge, full two miles as the crow flies, being after that time.⁴

In the author's mind, no contemptuous epithets seem too strong for his characterizations of Burnside. They become mere lampooning, and are repeated with gusto as often as opportunity can be made. And who was Burnside? A man who, having received his education at the Military Academy at West Point, promptly volunteered on the first call of the President, though he had left the army and was in important civil

¹ *O. R.*, XII., pt. 3, pp. 591, 622.

² *Id.*, p. 627.

³ *O. R.*, XIX., pt. 1, pp. 31, 419.

⁴ *O. R.*, LI., pt. 1, p. 844.

business. Taking the field as colonel of a Rhode Island regiment, his promotions came as the recognition of honorable service. At the head of a difficult and important expedition to the Carolina coast he won successes that were among the first to cheer the hearts of a loyal people. Coming back to help retrieve the disasters of McClellan's campaign against Richmond, the latter found in him a friend whom he could absolutely trust and was effusive in warmest expressions of affection. He went to Washington to advocate McClellan's cause, and the offer to himself of the command of the army gave him the power, in refusing it, to secure his friend's reinstatement at its head. He had conferred too great a favor, and the general recognition of the fact that he stood in the possible line of succession, must be held to have been the cause of jealousy, and at last, of enmity. When McClellan's fall came, Burnside still labored for his friend, and it cannot be denied that his unwillingness to take the command was honest and unfeigned. When disaster came to himself, he signalized his pure patriotism by seeking some less onerous post, where he could still serve his country. In East Tennessee he again proved capacity and courage, as even his enemies were finally forced to admit. Returning to the army at the East, he soon offered, of his own motion, to exchange his independent command under Grant for one of subordination under Meade, who had lately been his own subordinate, in order to simplify the working of the army machinery. His character commanded esteem and respect in every situation, whether in prosperity or in misfortune, in the field or in the Senate. His limitations, his faults may be, nay, must be, dissected by the historian; but right-minded people will be shocked whenever such a character is made the object of cynical satire. The smallest of his undisputed successes would have made the fortune of most of those who sneer at him.

In Mr. Bache's treatment of Grant, if for brevity's sake we select a typical example of his misjudgments, we may find it in his thrice-repeated assertion that Grant had unjustly "overshadowed" Meade by taking the field with the Potomac army, though "he had expressly stated that, as being in command of all the armies in the field, his proper place was in Washington."¹

Anyone passably familiar with the Rebellion history will at once recall that Grant had, with what was unusual vehemence for him, declared, from the first news of his appointment to the new grade of lieutenant-general, that nothing could induce him to do as Halleck had done in this matter of making Washington his personal headquarters. Being summoned there on March 4, 1864, he wrote to Sherman: "I start in the morning to comply with the order, but I shall say very distinctly on my arrival there, that I will accept no appointment which will require me to make that city my headquarters."² He stuck to his word, and the order which the President as Commander-in-chief made on March 11th, declared that "The headquarters of the army will be in Washington, and also with

¹ Pp. 364, 401, 554.

² *O. R.*, XXXII, pt. 3, p. 18.

Lieutenant-General Grant *in the field.*” As to the Washington office, the same order assigned General Halleck “to duty *in Washington* as Chief of Staff of the army, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding.”¹

Here we have the prompt execution of Grant’s purpose and the organization of command which he maintained till the peace. It is therefore with a sort of bewilderment that one finds Mr. Bache talking of Grant’s having “expressly stated” and made “his own confession” that he was, all the rest of the war, “absent from the place where he should have been.” No book discussing subjects of controversy in our Civil War ought now to be published without explicit reference to authorities, but Mr. Bache gives us none. Running the matter down, we seem to find it in Grant’s *Personal Memoirs*,² where he tells of his visit to Meade at Brandy Station on the 10th of March (the day before the order cited above was issued), and says “It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I was made Lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the situation, it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be.” The “here” manifestly meant with the Army of the Potomac, for he is at its headquarters in consultation with its commander. The antithesis is between “here” and “the West,” where he had previously expected to be in the field. To interpret this as meaning that he thought it his duty to stay in the city of Washington would be untenable if not another word were found to show Grant’s purpose; but when we read what he had written to Sherman and see him going back to the President and having an order issued the very next day which proclaimed his purpose to take the field; when the enemy seized upon the order, and we find their leaders telling each other that they must prepare to meet Grant in Virginia; the gloss upon Grant’s words becomes an amusing example of the blindness of prejudice.

The blindness is scarcely less when Mr. Bache declares it to be “favoritism” which gave Sherman the opportunity for “separate military renown” which was denied to Meade. Sherman had almost passionately begged Grant to stay in the West. No ambition for “separate military renown” had prevented him from urging that it was alike for Grant’s renown and for the interest of the country that Grant should remain at the head of the western army though it should keep himself a subordinate. He had a magnificent vision of that great army under Grant’s leadership sweeping across Georgia to the sea and northward again to Richmond, making “short work” of the seceding Atlantic States when “our task is done” in the West.³ If things had gone on in Virginia in 1864 as they had in 1863 it would not have been strange if Sherman’s vision had been realized in 1865 by Grant’s receiving Lee’s surrender somewhere between the Potomac and the Rapidan, coming from the south with the army of the West. It was with the honest purpose to let

¹ Id., p. 58.

² II. 116.

³ O. R., XXXII., pt. 3, p. 49.

the noble Army of the Potomac vanquish its own enemy that Grant gave up the more attractive vision, and the book before us is evidence of the scant thanks he got for it from those who should have been first in gratitude. It is hard to repress derisive laughter when a nephew of Meade quotes against Grant the Spanish equivalent of the English proverb, "One beat the bush and another caught the bird."

If history shows anything it is that the law to make Grant lieutenant-general (for his name might as well have been in its text) was passed when Congress and the country were almost in despair because the victory of Gettysburg was followed by six months of inaction or harmless peripatetics between Washington and Culpeper; because Lee was kept so little employed by a superior army that he dared to send one-third of his smaller force away to help Bragg beat Rosecrans at Chickamauga, and no advantage was taken of it. Had Meade clung to Lee in '63 as Sherman did to Johnston in '64, so that his campaign, like the other, would have been known among the soldiers as the "hundred days under fire," Richmond might have been taken nearly a year before Atlanta, and we should never have heard of its captor being "overshadowed" by anybody. He had his chance.

There is in Mr. Bache's book a good deal of careful analysis of army movements, much good topographical description, aided by maps which he has skilfully modified to meet the wants of the general reader. Its real significance, however, is in the controversial matter of which samples have been given, and with which every chapter is full. He has often been obliged to stop short in his campaign details because the scale to which he was writing would make his book too large, and this has prevented him from giving the reader the means of testing the value of the general judgments which he announces.

The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864. A Monograph. By JACOB D. COX, Late Major-General Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1897. Pp. x, 351.)

GENERAL COX—scholar, practised writer and excellent officer—gives the public in this volume a very clear account of the campaign in Tennessee under Gen. Thomas, after Gen. Sherman had left Hood, who had long resisted Sherman's three armies, to be taken care of by Thomas with the fragments, when 62,000 selected men had been withdrawn by Sherman for his March to the Sea. The general view of the situation, and the strategy of the campaign, the statement of the tactics and the description of the fighting at Franklin, are excellent. But the assumption in the outset, as if it were not a matter to be questioned, that Gen. Thomas was left with adequate forces, is wholly unsupported by the facts, as is now well known by all participants. It will attract the reader's attention to find in the opening paragraph that Franklin itself as a hard-fought field would not justify the volume, but that full cause for publication will be